Contractual relations between European VC-funds and investors : the impact of reputation and bargaining power on contractual design by Schmidt, Daniel & Wahrenburg, Mark
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contractual Relations between European VC-Funds 
and Investors: The Impact of Reputation and 
Bargaining Power on Contractual Design 
 
 
 
Daniel Schmidt 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main 
 
 
Mark Wahrenburg 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main 
 
April, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RICAFE - Risk Capital and the Financing of European Innovative Firms 
 
A project financed by the European Commission, DG Research 
Improving the Human Potential and the Socio- Economic Knowledge Base Programme.  
Contract No : HPSE-CT-2002-00140 
 
 Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics and Political Sciences 
Department of Economics and Finance, Turin University. 
Centre for Financial Studies - CFS (Frankfurt) 
Haute Etudes Commerciales - HEC (Paris) 
Working  Paper            NO.  008  
Contractual Relations between European VC–Funds and 
Investors: The Impact of Reputation and Bargaining Power on 
Contractual Design
1 
 
 
 
 
Daniel Schmidt 
d.schmidt@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de 
daniel.schmidt@cepres.de 
 
Mark Wahrenburg 
wahrenburg@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de 
 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main 
Mertonstraße 7 
D-60054 Frankfurt am Main 
Germany 
 
 
 
Working paper 
Revised Version: April 2004 
                                                 
1 We thank     Center of Private Equity Research for delivering data. Financial support from the European 
Commission, grant HPSE-CT-2002-00140, is gratefully acknowledged. Contractual Relations between European VC–Funds and Investors:  
The Impact of Reputation and Bargaining Power on Contractual Design  
 
Daniel Schmidt, Mark Wahrenburg 
 
Revised version: April 2004 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper explores factors that influence the design of financing contracts between 
venture capital investors and European venture capital funds. 122 Private Placement 
Memoranda and 46 Partnership Agreements are investigated in respect to the use of covenant 
restrictions and compensation schemes. The analysis focuses on the impact of two key 
factors: the reputation of VC-funds and changes in the overall demand for venture capital 
services.  
We find that established funds are more severely restricted by contractual covenants. This 
contradicts the conventional wisdom which assumes that established market participants care 
more about their reputation, have less incentive to behave opportunistically and therefore need 
less covenant restrictions. We also find that managers of established funds are more often 
obliged to invest own capital alongside with investors money. We interpret this as evidence 
that established funds have actually less reason to care about their reputation as compared to 
young funds. One reason for this surprising result could be that managers of established VC 
funds are older and closer to retirement and therefore put less weight on the effects of their 
actions on future business opportunities.  
We also explore the effects of venture capital supply on contract design. Gompers and Lerner 
(1996) show that VC-funds in the US are able to reduce the number of restrictive covenants in 
years with high supply of venture capital and interpret this as a result of increased bargaining 
power by VC-funds. We do not find similar evidence for Europe. Instead, we find that VC-
funds receive less base compensation and higher performance related compensation in years 
with strong capital inflows into the VC industry. This may be interpreted as a signal of 
overconfidence: Strong investor demand seems to coincide with overoptimistic expectations 
by fund managers which make them willing to accept higher powered incentive schemes.  
 
JEL: G32 
Keywords: Venture Capital, Contracting, Limited Partnership, Funds, Principal Agent, 
Compensation, Covenants, Reputation, Bargaining Power  2
 
 
1.  Introduction  
Long-term contracts that govern relationships between venture capital (VC) partnerships 
and investors determine all rights and obligations between the parties over the entire period of 
capital investment. A sophisticated contractual design may reduce principal-agent costs in the 
relation between investors and VC-fund-managers. Covenants that restrict the venture 
capitalists’ scope of action and compensation terms are the key items that govern the principal 
agent relationship. Based on the information exchanged at an initial date the parties design a 
pareto-optimal long-term contract.
1 The initial design of the partnership agreement (PA) is 
important because renegotiations are often very difficult to achieve due to the large number of 
involved investors.  
The VC-market is characterized by large information asymmetries.
2 Partnership 
agreements are not made public and show a high degree of dispersion. We are interested in 
the factors that affect contract design. In particular, we examine the effects of the reputation 
and bargaining power of VC-funds on the design of partnership agreements. Furthermore, we 
compare our results to those of the US in order to understand differences and similarities 
across both markets.   
In the United States, the VC-industry grew dramatically during the late 1970s and early 
1980s. It is today a mature and well established investment alternative.
3 The Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1979 was the most important factor accounting 
for the strong increase in capital inflows from institutional investors, especially pension funds, 
into the VC-sector.
4 In contrast, the continental European VC-fund industry used to be a very 
small market segment until the mid 1990
th and often is still today believed to be 
underdeveloped as compared to the US market. Figure 1 shows that the volume of the 
European private equity market between 1995 and 2001 evolved very similar to the 
development of the US market between 1978 and 1984. Existing empirical VC research 
concentrates on the US market. The long lasting US VC-history provides a much broader data 
                                                 
1 See Hart, O. /Holmström, B (1985), pp. 74 ff. 
2 See Feinendegen / Schmidt / Wahrenburg (2002), pp. 1. 
3 According to  Fenn/Liang/Prowse (1997), pp. 10 ff. and Yli-Renko/Hay (1999), pp. 25 ff. the Anglo-Saxon PE-
markets are also more established than the markets of continental Europe. Mainly the Anglo-Saxon buy-out 
market has a longer tradition than its Continental-European counterpart. About the history of private venture 
capital partnerships see Owen/Gardner/Bunder (1986), pp.77. 
4 See Gompers/Lerner (1996), pp. 466.   3
base for research.
5 Very little empirical insight into the European market segment exists up to 
date.
6 
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Figure 1 – Funds committed to independent US venture capital partnerships and to European Private Equity (PE) Funds. The US and the 
European data are obtained from the Venture Economics database and the EVCA-Yearbook 2001, respectably. No data for European VC-
fund commitments are available for the year preceding 1998. Therefore data of PE-fund commitments are used for comparison. 
 
In this study, we analyse 122 Private Placement Memoranda (PPM) and 46 partnership 
agreements of European VC-funds, which were raised between 1996 and the end of 2001. The 
key elements of partnership agreements analysed in this article are the compensation terms, 
the general partners own capital contribution to the fund, and the covenants that restrict the 
venture capitalists’ actions.
7 The size and quality of the analyzed dataset is unique and allows 
a highly representative analysis of contractual relations for the European VC-market. Given 
the similar growth pattern of the US VC-industry in the 1980s and the European VC-industry 
in the ending 1990s, results of this study seem to be comparable to two studies conducted by 
Gompers and Lerner in 1996 and 1999, which analyse US VC-partnership agreements for the 
time span between 1979 and 1992. 
We find that established funds have more contractual covenants than young debut funds 
with no established reputation. This contradicts the conventional argument which states that 
                                                 
5 See Barry (1994), pp.13. 
6 See Bascha/Walz (2001), pp. 1. 
7 See Sahlmann (1990), pp. 489 ff. and Gompers/Lerner (1996), pp. 464.   4
established market funds care more about their reputation, have their incentives better aligned 
with investors and therefore there is less need to use restrictive covenants. We also find that 
managers of established funds are more often obliged to invest own capital alongside with 
investors money. We interpret this as evidence that established funds have actually less reason 
to care about their reputation as compared to debut funds. Young fund managers may be 
better aligned with investors’ interests because only a good track record enables them to 
initiate profitable future fund raising campaigns. In contrast, managers of established VC 
funds are older and closer to retirement and therefore put less weight on the effects of their 
actions on future business opportunities.  
Contract design may also be affected by bargaining power effects. Gompers and Lerner 
(1996) show that VC-funds in the US are able to reduce the number of restrictive covenants in 
years with high supply of venture capital and interpret this as a result of increased bargaining 
power by VC-funds. We do not find similar evidence for Europe. Instead, we find that VC-
funds receive less base compensation and higher performance related compensation in years 
with strong capital inflows into the VC industry. We interpret this as an indication that fund 
managers may have been the victim of overconfidence.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section II outlines the principal agent problems 
between investors and venture capitalists and the importance of contractual arrangements. The 
section also describes the contractual items used in this study. Section III derives testable 
hypothesis based on existing theoretical models. Section IV summarizes related empirical 
evidence for the US. Section V describes in detail our data sample and provides summary 
statistics. Section VI presents the empirical results of the descriptive and uni-/multivariate 
analysis for Europe. Section VII concludes and gives an outlook on future research. 
2. Contractual relations between VC limited partnerships and investors 
a.  Conflicts of interest 
Barry (1994) characterizes the VC process as a multiple-agent relationship. Agency 
problems arise at the interaction between the venture capitalist and both the investors and the 
entrepreneurs.
8 The present study concentrates on the first step and analyses the relation 
between investors and venture capitalist.  
                                                 
8 See Barry (1994), pp.12 f.   5
The literature on agency problems in VC markets covers mainly the relationship between 
VC-firm and portfolio-company. This is the typical principal-agent framework where the 
entrepreneur is the agent and the venture capitalist is the principal. Less analysed is the 
additional relationship between the outside investors and the VC-fund. Sahlmann (1990) 
describes both levels of asymmetric information in a VC limited partnership. He gives an 
overview of VC-funding and describes potential conflicts between venture capitalists and 
their investors. Sahlmann suggests the solution for that principal-agent problem in an 
appropriate design of partnership agreements. Barry (1994) summarises former studies of VC 
funding. Moreover, he analyses new directions of potential research. He suggests the progress 
in research of “the contracting technology that permits venture capitalists to manage their dual 
roles as agents with respect to their limited partners-investors and as principals with respect to 
entrepreneurs in their portfolio firms.”
9 According to Barry, the same contractual mechanisms 
that are used to settle the relationships to their portfolio companies are often used to adjust 
investors’ concerns. He points out how difficult it is to develop empirical evidence on VC. 
Data on VC investments are always private.
10 Analysing the German VC market Zemke 
(1995) bases his studies about the solution of principal agent problems on empirical evidence 
developed from the data of 40 questionnaires. While he was doing a more general study he 
was even addressing contractual designs. Empirical papers by Gompers and Lerner (1996, 
1999 und 2001) analyse the structure of partnership agreements including compensation terms 
and the use of covenants. They develop hypotheses about the relationship between certain 
economical aspects and both the compensation of venture capitalists and the existence of 
covenants. Their analyses refer exclusively to US VC partnerships.
11 
The investment in VC-funds is associated with a high degree of information asymmetry. 
Monitoring the prospects and, furthermore, understanding the business of each individual 
investment done by the fund is extraordinary difficult for single investors. The venture 
capitalist has many opportunities to behave opportunistic and to take advantage of the 
delegated power. These potential conflicts have to be addressed in the partnership 
agreements.
12  
                                                 
9 See Barry (1994), pp. 13. 
10 See Barry (1994), pp. 13. Fenn, G. W./ Liang, N./ Prowse, (1996), pp. 7. 
11 See Tykvová, T. (2000), pp. 3 f. and Triantis, G. (2001). 
12 See Sahlmann (1990), pp.493 f.   6
Grossman and Hart (1993) suppose risk sharing between the principal and the agent as a 
general way of reducing agency problems.
13 In accordance to the findings developed in the 
literature of agency theory
14 Spremann (1988) and (1990) identifies three contractual ways of 
arranging compensation terms in order to reduce agency problems: First, the level of 
performance related compensation of the funds’ manager gives incentives to increase the 
capital gains of the fund. The relative level of variable to fix compensation is decisive. The 
complete efficiency of this incentive scheme, however, is based on the assumption, that a 
changing effort level of the agent can only induce higher capital gains and no capital loss. 
This assumption is not met in the case of VC investing. Second, the actions of the venture 
capitalist may be adjusted by compensating him for capital gains, but punishing him for 
capital loss. This effect can be achieved either by monetary or reputational gains and 
casualties.
15 Third, an obligation to compensate the capital loss with its own liquidity gives 
incentives to reduce opportunistic behaviour. However, this kind of contractual arrangement 
is not usual in the VC-industry. 
Besides these monetary incentives, contractual investment principles in form of 
covenants may prevent the venture capitalist from engaging in actions that are against the 
investors’ interest. 
b.  The VC partnership agreements 
The principal-agent relationships between investors (principal) and VC fund (agent) are 
governed by the partnership agreements and partly by the Private Placement Memoranda. The 
partnership agreements contain all relevant details, which determine the venture capitalists’ 
and the investors’ obligations. Private Placement Memoranda are usually used as marketing 
instruments representing only the key elements of the contractual relations between VC-fund 
and investors. The following key elements of partnership agreements represent the practical 
conversion of the mentioned theoretical aspects of financial contracting. 
 
                                                 
13 See Grossman/Hart (1983), pp.7. 
14 See Alchian/Demsetz (1972); Ross (1973); Stiglitz (1974); Mirrlees (1975); Jensen/Meckling (1976); 
Grossman/Hart (1983); Rees (1985).  
15 In the case of venture capital the managing directors are tied to monetary loss of the fund, if they made a 
capital contribution to the fund (own partnership shares). Our empirical results, however, disclose no correlation 
between the existence of a capital contribution done by the managing directors and their reputation. Therefore a 
substitution of one incentive given by a high reputation for another incentive (capital contribution) cannot be 
claimed. See theoretical discussion also in Hart, O. /Holmström, B (1985), pp. 79 f.   7
i.  Compensation terms 
The VC-firm receives two kinds of compensation for managing the investments in each 
limited partnership: the fixed component is the “management fee”, the performance related 
component is the “carried interest”.  
The management fee is, in general, expressed as a percentage on the committed capital 
and paid annually. Often the fee is tapered after the commitment period. This reflects the fact 
that less time has to be spent in managing activities, if the investments are mature and partly 
realized. Tapering the management fee is effected by either reducing the accounting basis on 
which the rate is applied – for example by replacing the committed capital by the real capital 
under management - or by reducing the percentage rate, which has to be paid for 
compensation. A tapered fee corresponds to the real purpose of the management fee to cover 
the costs of running and administering the fund. 
The second source of compensation, the carried interest, entitles the venture capitalists to 
a certain share of the capital gains of the fund.
 16 This incentive compensation corresponds to 
the first theoretical aspect of financial contracting mentioned by Spremann. The carried 
interest is only paid, if the investor has received back at least hundred per cent of his invested 
capital. Some partnerships contain a hurdle rate, which represents a preferred annually interest 
payment to the investor. The hurdle rate, however, is not a guaranteed interest payment to the 
investor. The existence of a hurdle rate reduces the VC-managers’ value of his carry option.  
Arrangements which obligate the managing directors to make a capital contribution to 
the fund increase the incentives to achieve high performance. While they invest their own 
capital in the vehicle the responsible managers also share a capital loss of the fund. This 
contractual obligation corresponds to Spremanns’ second theoretical proposal of reducing 
agency problems. 
ii.  Covenants 
Besides incentives that are provides by compensation terms, certain contractual 
restrictions regulate the actions of the managing directors. The covenants may prevent the 
funds’ managers from opportunistic behaviour and from acting in a selfish way. The 
conceptual framework commonly used in incomplete contract literature usually assumes that 
contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing or foreseeing future 
                                                 
16 See Brooks (1999), pp. 109 f.,  Sahlmann (1990), pp.491, Initiative Europe (2001), pp.10 ff.   8
states of nature in advance. According to the legal scholars of “incomplete contracting” the 
implementation of suitable covenants should fill the gaps in incomplete contracts.
17 A better 
specification of the venture capitalists’ obligations reduces future opportunities of 
opportunistic behaviour. Gompers/Lerner (1996) identified 14 covenants of US VC-
partnership agreements. In accordance to this study, we explored for a better comparison of 
the results the 14 most relevant and frequent covenants of European partnership agreements. 
The analysed covenants regulate relevant aspects of the principal agent relationship and 
safeguard the investors’ interests. We divided the analysed covenants into three classes: Class 
one covenants regulate the overall funds’ management. Covenants of class two and of class 
three restrict the activities of the managing directors and the types of investments, 
respectively.
18 
3. Hypothesis about the determinants of contractual design  
a.  Reputation as a driver of contractual design 
Raising funds is a function of the venture capitalists’ ability to convince potential 
investors of their management quality. This means, only high performance venture capitalists 
are able to raise follow-on-funds and, while working trustworthy, to develop high reputation. 
Tradelis (1997) developed a reputation model in which a firms’ only asset is its name. This 
comes close to the situation in the VC business where a respected name is the basis of high 
reputation. Spremann (1988) discusses reputation in general as an incentive to continue high 
quality management and not to engage in opportunistic behaviour. Within the principal agent 
relationship reputation can be seen as a security given by the agent to the principal. The value 
of that security is developed, because misbehaviour or actions against the interests of the 
principal may reduce the agents’ reputational capital. As a result, opportunities of future fund 
raisings would decline.
19 The potential opportunity of losing reputation may be seen as an 
extraordinary intangible contract between the investor and the venture capitalist.
20 This 
additional security given by high reputation may have effects on the compensation terms and 
the need for covenants. 
                                                 
17 See Ayres, I. / Gertner, R. (1992).  
18 See Wahrenburg/ Feinendegen / Schmidt (2002) give a detailed overview of all covenant classes and their 
effects in a principal agent relationship. The appendix gives a quality description of the analysed covenants. 
19 See also the incentive schemes of section 2.a: The loss of reputation can be seen as a punishment for 
opportunistic behavior. 
20 See Spremann (1988), pp. 619.   9
Leaving out important covenants that regulate the relation between investors and the 
venture capitalists means less specified obligations for future states. These incomplete 
contracts open opportunities of acting in an opportunistic way, because future contract 
renegotiations are unusual and mostly not possible. Inherent incentives given by the risk of 
loosing reputation may adjust those less specified contractual relations. The costly need to 
implement covenants may be reduced. On the contrary, young venture capitalists without 
reputational capital are confronted with an increased need to specify their future obligations. 
They have no inherent incentives given by the existence of reputation which fill the gaps of 
incomplete contracts without the needed restrictions. According to that common theoretical 
approach we develop the hypothesis that fund managers with high reputation integrate fewer 
covenants that are costly to implement and to monitor. 
Venture capitalists with high reputation will charge that additional security. Gompers and 
Lerner (1999) introduce two models which could explain the variation in compensation.
21 The 
signalling model predicts higher fixed fees for older and larger venture capital organizations 
that demand insurance. They charge that additional security given by a high reputation. They 
demand for higher fixed fees. Non-debut funds with established reputation, therefore, have 
relatively lower powered monetary incentive schemes than first time funds. Here, incentives 
are given by a potential loss of their reputation. On the contrary, the learning model predicts 
first time fund managers to work harder anyway to gain reputation. Highly incentive 
compensation is not necessary. This model predicts that young managers charge higher fixed 
fees in relation to performance related fees. Therefore, debut funds have less monetary 
incentives.  
b.  Bargaining power as a driver of contractual design 
This hypothesis contends that the relative supply and demand situation in the VC-market 
determines the bargaining power of the managers in times of fund raising. Since the 
partnership agreements are usually not renegotiated, this is not a repeated bargaining 
environment.
22 The fund managers’ bargaining power at an initial date affects the contractual 
design and, therefore, all future options. According to a certain supply/demand situation the 
equilibrium price adjustment takes place. This happens invisible through the insertion or 
deletion of covenants and visible through explicit monetary compensation. Less contractual 
                                                 
21 Complete description and derivation of the learning and signalling model in Gompers/Lerner (1999), pp. 7 ff. 
and Appendix A and B. 
22 For a model of repeated bargaining see Eberwein (2000).   10
restrictiveness and higher fixed or higher performance related compensation represent both 
different kinds of non-monetary and monetary charges, respectively, the investor has to pay. It 
is less likely to attract the investors’ attention by varying less visible contractual elements, e.g. 
the number of included covenants.
23 Consequently these less visible contractual elements are 
often subject to high variations, in contrast to highly standardized well known contract 
elements. 
The equilibrium price of venture capital services increases in times with high relative 
demand for VC-services. We assume that the fund managers use their bargaining power to 
lower their bonding costs. Fewer covenants which restrict the managers’ future options may 
be included. Though real life VC long term partnership agreements do not completely 
conform the predictions of complete contracting, contracts in times with high demand for VC-
services may be less sophisticated.  
Next to declining bonding costs, an increase of the equilibrium price for VC-services can 
effect higher ´monetary´ compensations. We assume that venture capitalists in times with 
relatively high demand for their services use that negotiating power. They may try to save that 
temporary advantage for the whole funds’ lifetime by demanding higher fixed fees. Just the 
fixed management fee is that part of the compensation which is guaranteed and calculable 
over the next years. Assuming increasing fixed payments, the performance sensitivity of 
compensation and, therefore, the degree of management incentives are decreasing. 
4. Related literature – empirical evidence for the US 
Gompers / Lerner (1999) and (1996) analyse the contractual relations between investors 
and US venture capital funds. They also examine the use of covenants and compensation 
terms as contractual arrangements to reduce agency problems. Gompers and Lerner (1999) 
find empirical evidence that reputation is an important factor determining compensation 
terms. In the US, fund managers with high reputation charge lower fixed fees. The sensitivity 
to performance is higher. These findings are consistent with the learning model.
 They found 
no significant effect of reputation on the use of covenants.  
On the other hand, a relatively higher demand for VC-services leads to a declining 
number of included covenants. The number of covenants is reduced in growth years. US 
venture capitalists use their bargaining power to lower their bonding costs. Since there is no 
                                                 
23 According to Gompers/Lerner (1996), pp. 472.   11
effect of higher bargaining power on the monetary “compensation” like management fee or 
carry, conditions of new demand/supply situations are exclusively adjusted by varying 
invisible elements.
24 Contractual relations become incomplete. A new equilibrium price of 
VC-services is not adjusted by the price mechanism through varying monetary charges. This 
indicates inefficient contracting. Obligations to make a capital contribution and the 
implementation of hurdle rates were not analysed by Gompers and Lerner. No value of the 
carry option was calculated. 
5. The data sample  
A dataset comprising of 122 private placement memoranda and 46 partnership 
agreements of European VC-funds is used for this study. Data was collected from the archive 
of one of the oldest and largest VC fund of fund firms in Europe. We restricted the analysis to 
independent private limited partnerships, which engage exclusively in VC investment and are 
located in a European country. We did not include PPM’s and PA’s which had other 
investment types stated in their prospectus, such as LBO’s, MBO’s, or turnarounds. If the 
fund was managed from different offices in Europe, we use the country of the main office as 
the funds’ origin.  
Placement memoranda and partnership agreements are confidential data and not publicly 
available. Therefore, a complete survey of all European funds is not possible. The sample is 
taken from the original deal flow which is not subject to a selection bias. We assessed the 
completeness and representativeness of the sample by comparing it with the market data 
published by the European venture capital association (EVCA). Table 1 shows the samples’ 
summary statistics. The level of representativeness is examined in the first row. The complete 
sample represents 35 per cent of the overall European market of independent VC-funds.
25 
Besides statements about the overall market, we developed all measures for the three 
countries with the highest aggregated sample volume of funds raised. The survey of German 
VC funds is almost complete. The level of representativeness of UK-based partnerships is 
also above the mean. Furthermore, the sample is well balanced concerning characteristics like 
the time in business, the experience, the investment stage, and sector. The sample size until 
the year 1997 is quite small. This concerns to the fact, that in the UK, which is the country 
                                                 
24 Gompers /Lerner (1999), pp. 23 ff. and Gompers / Lerner (1996), pp. 490. 
25 The European venture capital association (EVCA) is only recording the volume of independent VC-funds 
raised since the year 1998. No statements are made about the number of venture capital firms on the market. 
Therefore the degree of representativeness is measured on basis of the samples and the overall markets funds’ 
volume of the years 1998, 1999, and 2000. No distortion should be assumed, because the development of the 
VC-market corresponds to the development of the deal flow.   12
with the longest history of private equity financing, mainly buy out funds emerged in the 
80ties and early 90ties. The establishment of new market segments like the EASDAQ in 
Brussels and other new markets in continental Europe between the year 1996 and 1997 were 
basically the reason for a growing VC-industry.   
  Total sample Germany UK France 
Representativeness of sample 
Funds volume  35% 95,30% 37,10% 27,55% 
Funds size [Mio €] 
Mean 130,8 116 143 95 
Median 75,6 50 120 91 
Std. deviation  227 278 96 60 
Time in Business [years] 
Mean 4 3,3 4,8 5,5 
Median 2 1 2,5 4 
Std. deviation  5,16 4,8 6 4,9 
Investment stage [percentage on survey] 
Early 58,20% 57,20% 50,00% 76,90% 
Balanced 30,40% 33,30% 35,70% 15,40% 
Later 11,40% 9,50% 14,30% 7,70% 
Investment sector [percentage on survey] 
High-tech 91,80% 95,00% 96,00% 100% 
Non-high-tech 8,20% 5,00% 4,00% 
Reputation  [percentage on survey] 
Debut fund  47,15% 59,52% 42,86% 23,08% 
Non-debut fund  52,85% 40,48% 57,14% 76,92% 
Date 
1996 2,50% 5%   
1997 2,50%    8% 
1998 9% 12% 8% 15% 
1999 18% 24% 25% 15% 
2000 37% 35% 35% 54% 
2001 31% 24% 32% 8% 
Notes: This sample descriptive refers to the complete dataset of 122 European VC-Funds. Funds originated in the 
following countries were included (number of included funds): Germany (43), UK (29), Switzerland (5), 
Netherlands (5), Norway (3), France (13), Sweden (4), Italy (2), Ireland (3), Belgium (4), Iceland (1), Spain (1), 
Luxemburg (1), Denmark (2), Finland (1), Pan-European (5). The representativeness of the sample is measured as 
the ratio of the aggregated funds volume of the sample partnerships (total or each regional segment) and the total 
volume of the VC-market (total or the regional segment). For calculations in the last three columns, the data of 
every country are used as completely separate datasets.   
Table 1: Sample Summary 
We collected the relevant data on compensation terms (Management Fee, Carried 
Interest, Hurdle Rate) from the PPMs. These offering memoranda are used as marketing 
instruments and describe all details on the VC-firm, the funds’ manager, the investment 
strategy and the investment conditions. Using the PAs we generated a separate dataset for the 
analysis of the included covenants and capital contributions of the funds’ manager. The PAs 
contain all relevant data, including data about the rights and obligations of the managing 
directors and the limited partners. For every PA the corresponding PPM was available. So we   13
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could verify all compensation data with those we have collected from the PPMs. All 
currencies were converted to Euro.  
6. Empirical results for Europe 
In this section, we examine the factors that affect contract design. We use several proxies 
of reputation and bargaining power and employ univariate as well as multivariate empirical 
tests. 
a.  Descriptive statistics 
The relations between the investors and the venture capitalists are basically determined 
by the mentioned contractual arrangements. These are both the included covenants and the 
sensitivity of compensation determined by the level of the management fee over the funds’ 
life, the carried interest, the hurdle rate, and the capital contribution. The agreements are quite 
heterogenous and observing these variables are connected with different efforts. The 
management fee, the carried interest, and the hurdle rate are represented in the easy readable 
and understandable private placement memoranda. The obligated degree of capital 
contribution and the included covenants are difficult to observe from the partnership 
agreements.  
Easy visible factors are highly standardized. Figure 2 presents the distribution of the 
management fee which has to be paid in the first years after closing (this is constant for the 
years of the commitment period). It shows, that 60 (20) per cent of the venture capitalists 
charge 2,5 (2) per cent p.a. of committed capital as a fixed fee. 
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Figure 2: Management Fee        Figure 3: NPV of Management Fee 
 
 Coping the assumptions of the bargaining power hypothesis that fund managers with 
high bargaining power are induced to increase their fixed compensation over the whole funds’   14
life, we base our analyses on the net present value of management fee paid over the whole 
funds’ life.
26 The present value of the management fee paid over the funds’ life is the real 
charge that the investor has to pay for the funds’ management. Figure 3 presents the 
distribution of the net present value of the management fee. It shows that its degree differs 
much more between the funds than the management fee paid in the first years.  
While examining the distribution of the carried interest we show that about 90 per cent of 
the VC-firms are allocated to 20 per cent of the profits (Figure 4). This exceeds the level of 
standardization, which was found for US VC-funds. Gompers/Lerner (1999) found only in 81 
per cent of the US-sample a carried interest between 20 and 21 per cent of the capital gains. 
The distribution of the hurdle rates, as preferred returns given to the investor, is shown in 
figure 5.  Nearly 50% of the funds do not have any hurdle rate. The variation is much higher 
as that of the carried interest.  
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Figure 4:  Carried  Interest     Figure 5: Hurdle Rate 
 
In general, the venture capitalists’ equity participation has the character of a call option 
that entitles the venture capitalists to a certain share of the increase in value of the underlying 
fund. The exercise price corresponds to the cost basis of the fund. The hurdle rate has to be 
taken into account. The funds’ life equals the life of the option.
27 Based on a Binomial model, 
we calculated the option value under consideration of a changing participation on capital 
                                                 
26 For calculating the NPV of the management fee we made the following assumptions: Following 
Gompers/Lerner (1999), we discounted the annually management fee (as a particular percentage on committed 
capital) with a rate of 10%. If the base used to calculate the fee varies over fund life and if its level is becoming 
uncertain (e.g., the capital under management), we discounted the corresponding fee with an increased rate of 
20%. Despite that the individual funds’ life time is usually stated in the PPMs’, we calculated the NPV of the 
management fee over a standardized time period of ten years. This concerns to the fact that usually a life time 
extension is possible. An exact time period, during which the investor has to pay the fee, is not predictable. An 
assumed life time of 10 years excludes incorrect changes of the calculated level of the NPV of the management 
fee as a result of different inexact statements that are made in advance. This calculation procedure is the same 
done by Gompers and Lerner. For more information see Gompers/Lerner (1999), Appendix D.  
27 See examples in Sahlmann (1990), pp. 496. 
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gains (carry) and changing hurdle rates. This numerical analysis suggests that the ex ante 
mean value of the carry option is about 15.30 (median: 15.22%) per cent of the total invested 
fund capital.
28 There is a 92% concentration of the carry option value at 15.22 per cent. This 
high standardization is reasoned by the ignorable effect of the relatively small hurdle rates on 
the option value. Its value is exclusively determined by the changing performance 
participation. In Europe, variations of incentive compensation, therefore, mainly base on the 
varying degree of fixed payments in relation to both the highly standardized performance 
related payments and the option value of the carried interest. 
Following Spremanns’ agency theoretical explanations a purely participation in capital 
gains, like the carried interest, has only limited effect to increase the venture capitalists’ 
incentives to act in accordance with the investors interests. A capital contribution of the 
managing directors ties their monetary interests directly to the investors’ interests. An 
additional, but less visible instrument of increasing the incentives, therefore, is the capital 
contribution done by the managing directors. Obligatory arrangements are components of the 
partnership agreements. Figure 6 presents the distribution of the obligated capital 
contributions. About 38 per cent of the samples’ venture capitalists make no capital 
contribution and fail to add this relevant incentive scheme.  
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Figure 6: Capital Contribution       Figure 7: Number of Covenants 
                                                 
28 We based these calculations on similar assumptions made by Sahlmann (1990), pp.496 ff. Using the Black-
Scholes model, the options’ value is a function of volatility, the current market value of the funds’ assets, the risk 
free rate, the profit participation (in%), the time to maturity, the strike price, and the hurdle rate. We assumed 
that the current market value of the fund equals the total original capital of the fund (the funds’ costs). We set the 
median time to maturity of the samples’ funds (10 years) as the options lifetime. According to Sahlmann (1990), 
we assumed a risk free rate of 10% and a volatility of 50%. The level of profit participation equals the individual 
funds’ carried interest arrangements. The strike price is set to be 100%. The results without consideration of a 
hurdle rate are consistent with those of Sahlmann (1990). Due to the fact that the hurdle rate is an annually 
preferred return which is paid on capital that is drawn down deal by deal, exact determinations of the real option 
values are not possible. The calculated option values are only approaching the real values.    16
Covenants regulating the venture capitalists’ actions are also difficult to observe, but 
substantial for the relationship between the involved parties. Feinendegen/ Schmidt/ 
Wahrenburg (2002) summarize detailed representation and frequencies of the fourteen 
analysed covenant classes. Figure 7 presents the distribution of the overall number of included 
covenants, which will be, following for better comparisons the procedure of Gompers/Lerner 
(1996), the basis of the regression analysis. 
The descriptive statistics are summarized in table 2. 
  Obs.  Min. Max  Mean Median St. Dev. Confidence level (95%) for mean 
Management 
Fee 
119 0,4% 
p.a.
4,0% 
p.a. 
2,43% 
p.a.
2,50% 
p.a.
0,00448 0,008% 
PV of 
management 
Fee 
119 2,85% 24,23% 
 
15,09% 15,29% 0,0300 0,54% 
Carried 
Interest 
120 2,00% 30,00% 20,10% 20,00% 0,0242 0,44% 
Option Value 
of Carried 
Interest 
120 1,522% 22,83%  15,3% 15,22% 0,0183 0,332% 
Hurdle Rate  122  0% 15% 
p.a. 
3,6% 
p.a.
2% p.a. 0,0387 0,69% 
Capital 
contribution 
46 0% 20%  1,53% 0,75% 0,0381 1,1% 
Covenants 46  0 11  4,45 5,00 3,10 0,92 
Notes: The complete dataset contains information of 122 private placement memoranda and 46 partnership agreements. 
Private placement memoranda contains information about the Management Fee, the Carried Interest and the Hurdle Rates. 
Some data concerning the Management Fee and the Carried Interest were missing. For analysis the corresponding PPMs 
were sorted out and the dataset reduced. Information about the capital contribution and the covenants were components of 
the partnership agreements. 
Table 2:Descriptive Statistics 
b.  Univariate comparisons 
We made univariate comparisons for that kind of contractual components, which are 
varying among the sample funds. The carried interest is highly standardized and, therefore, 
not analysed for variation in dependence of the mentioned determinants. Due to the highly 
standardized carried interest, incentive schemes are actually characterized and their quality is 
determined by the amount of capital contribution and by the ratio of performance related to 
fixed compensation. Furthermore contractual gaps should be closed by the implementation of 
covenants. 
Testing the reputation hypothesis we used the differentiation debut fund manager or non-
debut fund manager as the proxy for the venture capitalists’ reputation. Only high 
performance fund managers who developed reputation by high-performing first funds are able 
to raise a follow on fund. First time fund managers without track record have no reputational   17
capital.
29 Sometimes, the VC-firms’ age or time in business is used as a proxy for its 
reputation. In the literature this measure is developed on the assumption that VC-firms, which 
are able to stay a long time in business, are high quality and well positioned. Low-quality 
venture capitalists should be unable to raise new funds and, therefore, to stay in business over 
a longer period of time.
30 As control variables we integrated also venture capitalists’ age and 
the fund size. Nevertheless, we assume that the differentiation between first time fund 
managers and managers who have raised at least one fund before is a stronger proxy for 
reputation. The age of a venture capital firm and their actual fund size can be influenced by 
lots of other factors regardless of their reputation, e.g. an initial capital commitment by a 
captive sponsor to help the funds’ market positioning even if it is the first fund of an unknown 
fund manager.
31 
Testing the bargaining power hypothesis we used the relative growth of the venture 
capital pool as the proxy for the supply/demand situation and, therefore, the managers’ 
bargaining power. The bargaining power of the venture capitalists is rising, when the demand 
for VC-services is increasing relative to a fixed number of VC- firms. We assume a low 
elasticity of new venture services (fixed number of VC-services within a short time horizon) 
to increasing inflows. Therefore, bargaining power can be measured by the ratio of capital 
inflow and the existing venture pool. This corresponds exactly to the proxy that is used by 
Gompers and Lerner (1996).  
                                                 
29 See Gompers / Lerner (1996), pp. 466 and Gompers/Lerner (1999), pp. 7 ff. and 17; besides the fact, that the 
venture capital firm raised at least one fund , which was managed as professional that the investors will entrust 
this venture capitalists with capital again, the cumulative experience of all the involved individual managing 
directors can be taken as a proxy of the degree of experience and reputation of the venture capital firm. Often 
reputation of a managing team is strongly dependent on the reputation of its members. Unfortunately, statements 
about the history and experience of the individual managers associated with the fund are very heterogeneous. 
Whereas in some PPMs complete CV’s of the managing directors are given, often the statements about the 
individual backgrounds are incomplete or missing. Furthermore, it is unclear how to compare the different 
former activities to build a appropriate measure of experience. A practical measure often used to represent the 
managers experience is their active time in a business, which relates to the business of venture capital financing. 
Even if this measure could be designed, only some PPMs provide detailed biographical information. The dataset 
would be reduced to a small number. To address this concern this measure of reputation should not be used as an 
separate independent variable, but may underline the quality of the variable “Non-Debut Fund” as a proxy for 
the managing venture capitalists’ reputation. To assess reputation and experience we examined the cumulative 
time in business of the associated managing directors. 11 PPMs provide complete biographical information. The 
analysis shows the tendency that “Non-Debut Funds” are managed by venture capital teams, whose cumulative 
time in business exceeds the time, which was spend by “Debut Fund” manager teams in VC-business. The 
Pearson correlation coefficient of 0,69 is significant at the 5% level (p-value: 0,017 / 2-tailed). 
30 See Gompers/Lerner (1999), pp. 8 Fn. 3, pp. 14 f. and (1996), pp. 475 f.; see also Franzke (2001), pp.22. 
31 A long time in business not always implicates an overall high reputation and experience as well. Often venture 
capitalists were e.g., just consulting other VC-related businesses before they were raising their own fund. 
Sometimes, venture capitalists have just invested in some single companies and consider that as their time in 
business, even if they did not raise any real fund.  They are, therefore, not obligatory experienced in financial 
contracting, if they are in business for a long time, and do not have a reputation in managing large funds.   18
We include some variables to control for other factors that may influence contractual 
design. By doing that, we isolate the effects of reputation and bargaining measures. To 
exclude a potential time trend as a result of a professionalizing young European market we 
included the date of fund raising as a control variable.
32 Furthermore, we assume differences 
between the Continental-European and Anglo-Saxon legal environments. Starting with 
LaPorta (1997) literature shows the influence of legal systems on the evolution of the capital 
markets. Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) examine whether the legal origin matters. They indicate 
on most measures that common law countries, like the Anglo-Saxon countries, appear to be 
more financially developed than countries belonging to the civil or Roman law tradition. This 
also becomes apparent on heavier property rights protection in Anglo-Saxon countries.
33 The 
integration of a dummy variable which indicates Anglo-Saxon funds prevents possible 
distortions. Two further control dummy variables, that indicate early stage and non high-tech 
funds, filter out the need for stronger regulations and effects of higher administrative costs on 
contractual design.
34 Gompers (1995) mentions a higher level of asymmetric information 
distribution between the VC-firm and early stage investments than between the VC-firm and 
later stage investments. The existence of no or only a short history of these companies 
complicates evaluating their business. More information about later stage investments and 
companies acting in well known business fields (with traditional product lines) lower the 
associated agency costs.
35 Ruhnka/Young (1991) and (1987) concluded after a survey of 73 
US-VC-firms a higher risk level for ventures in a lower development stage. Managerial and 
technological weaknesses have been detected as the major risk factors of early stage 
investments.
36 The venture capitalist, therefore, is confronted with a closer monitoring and has 
to compensate these weaknesses by consulting the entrepreneur.
37 Gompers (1995) has 
empirically assessed that the monitoring activity rises in situations with increasing 
asymmetric information distribution.
38 The associated higher costs of running and 
administrating the fund may be beard by the investors’ management fee payments.
39 Within 
the context of agency problems between the limited partners and the venture capitalists 
Gompers and Lerner (1996) argue, that the funds’ investment focus may be a relevant 
variable, which determine the potential for opportunistic behaviour. Managing directors of 
                                                 
32 A low Pearson correlation of -0,227 between the time and the growth of the VC-pool indicates no correlation. 
33 See Glaeser/Shleifer (2001), pp. 1 and 33 f., see also Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, Levine (2002). 
34 See Gompers/Lerner (1999), pp. 19 f. 
35 See Gompers (1995), pp. 1463 and 1477 f. 
36 See Ruhnka/Young (1991),pp. 121 and Ruhnka/Young (1987),pp.170 ff. and Bauer/Bilo/Zimmermann (2001), 
pp. 10. 
37 See Kaplan/Strömberg (2001), pp. 6. 
38 See also Tykvova (2000), pp. 7. 
39 See Gompers/Lerner (1999), pp. 8.   19
early-stage and high-technology funds may have more scope to engage in opportunistic 
behaviour.
40 This may strongly affect the contractual design. Monetary incentives given by 
performance related compensation (carried interest) and capital contribution of the managing 
directors may reduce opportunistic activities. Covenants may provide a higher degree of 
control and may restrict the actions of the venture capitalist.
41 By implementing the control 
variables which indicate early stage and non-high tech focused funds the sole effects of 
reputation and bargaining power on contractual design are isolated.  
Table 3 and 4 summarize the univariate comparisons for the management fee (as 
percentage on committed capital p.a.) and the NPV of the management fee (as percentage of 
the committed capital), respectively. We compare the mean values for funds with different 
characteristics referring to the funds’ reputation, the time when the fund was closed, the legal 
origin, and the fund’s focus. Furthermore, we compare the mean values of the funds which are 
above and below the median referring to time in business, the size of funds, and the growth of 
the VC-pool at the time of funds’ closing.    
Management Fee 
  Mean Std. Deviation p-value 
-equal variances not 
assumed- 
[Equal variances] 
Test for 
Equality of 
variances:
p-value
Debut fund 
Non-debut fund 
0,2446 [N=57]
0,2417 [N=62]
0,00586
0,00270
0,739 
[0,733] 
0,011**
Time in business 
> median 
<= median 
0,0236 [N=56]
0,0249 [N=63]
0,00283
0,00549
 
0,093* 
[0,104] 
0,395
Size of VC-Fund 
> median 
<= median 
0,0234 [N=57]
0,0251 [N=62]
0,00263
0,00557
 
0,04** 
[0,044**] 
0,179
Growth of VC-pool in year 
of first closing 
> median 
<= median 
 
0,0237 [N=58]
0,0248 [N=61]
 
0,00372
0,00506
 
 
0,152 
[0,155] 
 
0,784
Year of closing 
2000-2001 
1996-1999 
0,0244 [N=83]
0,0240 [N=36]
0,00414
0,00523
 
0,677 
[0,647] 
0,098
Anglo-Saxon legal origin 
Continental-European origin 
0,0237 [N=30]
0,0245 [N=89]
0,00234
0,00499
0,270 
[0,427] 
0,182
Early stage 
Non-early stage 
0,251 [N=70]
0,231 [N=49]
0,00427
0,00455
0,02** 
[0,018**] 
0,148
High-tech 
Non-high-tech 
0,2447 [112]
0,2179 [7]
0,00451
0,00313
0,067* 
[0,124] 
0,979
        
Notes: The mean of the management fee (as percentage on committed capital p.a.) is compared for funds with different characteristics. 
The dataset includes 119 European VC-funds, for which complete data about the management fees were available. The dataset is 
divided by the funds’ reputation, the funds’ origin, and the funds’ investment stage and sector. Furthermore, funds with several 
measures above the median are compared with funds below the median. Standard t-test is used as test for differences in means. The 
                                                 
40 See Gompers, P. / Lerner, J. (1996), pp. 484. 
41 See Kaplan/ Strömberg (2001), pp.6 identified those contractual solutions in the context of financial 
contracting between venture capitalist and entrepreneurs. Sahlmann (1990), pp.513 indicated similar problems 
and contractual solutions between Venture Capitalist and both entrepreneur and investor.   20
third column presents the p-values of the t-test, if equal variances are not assumed. The null hypothesis says that these distributions are 
identical. One, two and three asterisks indicate a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance, 
respectively. As extensions in brackets the p-values under assumption of equal variances are shown. The fourth column represents the 
Levene’s test for equality of variances, with the null hypothesis saying that the distributions are identical. 
Table 3: Univariate Comparisons ‘Management Fee’ 
Despite a generally standardized management fee, some significant differences can be 
found, if the PPMs are divided by fund focus (stage and sector), time in business, and funds’ 
size. A significantly higher management fee is charged by funds with early stage and high-
tech focus, by small funds, and by venture capitalists which are not active in business for a 
long time. Analysing the NPV of the management fee, univariate comparisons show the same 
significant differences for funds with different investment focuses (early/later stage and high-
tech/non-high-tech focus). The other differences cannot be confirmed. The NPV of the 
management fee, however, decreases significantly, if the fund was established at times of 
rapidly growing VC-inflows (table 4). This supports neither the bargaining power nor the 
reputation hypothesis. The bargaining power hypothesis is rejected. Under consideration of 
the superior importance of the NPV of the management fee as a measure of fixed fee 
commitments these results seem to be the only meaningful. 
 
Present Value of Management Fee over Funds’ Life 
  Mean Std. Deviation p-value 
-equal variances not 
assumed- 
[Equal variances] 
Test for 
Equality of 
variances:
p-value
Debut fund 
Non-debut fund 
0,1510
0,1509
0,0350
0,0249
0,976 
[0,976] 
0,130
Time in business 
> median 
<= median 
0,1476
0,1534 
0,0238
0,0350
 
0,288 
[0,295] 
0,071*
Size of VC-Fund 
> median 
<= median 
0,1472 
0,1540 
0,0218
0,0364
 
0,223 
[0,225] 
0,031**
Growth of VC-pool in year 
of first closing 
> median 
<= median 
0,1450 
0,1566 
0,0280
0,0310
 
 
0,035** 
[0,036**]  0,602
Year of closing 
2000-2001 
1996-1999 
0,1515
0,1495 
0,0285
0,0336
 
0,759 
[0,742] 
0,271
Anglo-Saxon legal origin 
Continental-European origin 
0,1438
0,1533
0,0211
0,0322
0,067* 
[0,132] 
0,245
Early stage 
Non-early stage 
0,1570
0,1422
0,0255
0,0339
0,011**] 
[0,007***] 
0,141
High-tech 
Non-high-tech 
0,1525
0,1297
0,02887
0,03900
0,121 
[0,021**] 
0,245
 
Notes: The net present value of the management fee over funds’ life (as percentage on committed capital) is compared for funds with 
different characteristics. The dataset includes 119 European VC-funds, for which complete data about the management fees were 
available. For more details see notes of table 3. 
Table 4: Univariate Comparisons ‘NPV of Management Fee’ 
Univariate analyses show no significant variations of the hurdle rate if the sample is 
divided by the known measures (table 5).   21
 
Hurdle Rate 
  Mean Std. Deviation p-value 
-equal variances not 
assumed- 
[Equal variances] 
Test for 
Equality of 
variances:
p-value
Debut fund 
Non-debut fund 
0,0390 [N=58]
0,033 [N=64]
0,0356
0,0390
0,424 
[0,424] 
0,551
Time in business 
> median (2 years) 
<= median 
0,033 [N=57]
0,039 [N=62]
0,0384
0,0390
 
0,342 
[0,343] 
0,947
Size of VC-Fund 
> median (€ 75,55 Mio) 
<= median 
0,034 [N=60]
0,038 [N=60]
0,0392
0,0382
 
0,543 
0,543 
0,854
Growth of vc-pool in year of 
first closing 
> median (60,69%) 
<= median 
0,031 [N=58]
0,039 [N=64]
0,0371
0,0401
 
 
0,428 
[0,430] 
0,200
Year of closing 
2000-2001 
1996-1999 
0,038 [N=85]
0,030 [N=37]
0,0385
0,0447
 
0,348 
[0,304] 
0,217
Anglo-Saxon legal origin 
Continental-European origin 
0,038 [N=31]
0,035 [N=91]
0,0428
0,0374
0,791 
[0,776] 
0,173
Early stage 
Non-early stage 
0,0317 [N=72]
0,0428 [N=50]
0,0369
0,0406
0,114 
[0,108] 
0,153
High-tech 
Non-high-tech 
0,035 [N=115]
0,051 [N=7]
0,0389
0,0351
0,296 
[0,303] 
0,208
 
Notes: The mean of the hurdle rate is compared for funds with different characteristics. The dataset includes 122 European VC-funds, 
for which complete data about the management fees were available. For more details see notes of table 3. 
Table 5: Univariate Comparisons ‘Hurdle Rate’ 
 
Carry option value 
  Mean Std. Deviation p-value 
-equal variances not 
assumed- 
[Equal variances] 
Test for 
Equality of 
variances:
p-value
Debut fund 
Non-debut fund 
0,1546 [N=57]
0,1513 [N=63]
0,0107
0,024
0,338 
[0,321] 
0,365
Time in business 
> median (2 years) 
<= median 
0,1527 [N=57]
0,1533 [N=61]
0,0219
0,0148
 
0,866 
[0,864] 
0,727
Size of VC-Fund 
> median (€ 75,55 Mio) 
<= median 
0,1520 [N=58]
0,1540 [N=60]
0,0210
0,0158
 
0,555 
[0,553] 
0,717
Growth of vc-pool in year of 
first closing 
> median (60,69%) 
<= median 
0,1081 [N=58]
0,1069 [N=63]
0,007
0,0168
 
 
0,591 
[0,602] 
0,097
Year of closing 
2000-2001 
1996-1999 
0,1527 [N=83]
0,1517 [N=36]
0,0181
0,0147
 
0,745 
[0,764] 
0,988
Anglo-Saxon legal origin 
Continental-European origin 
0,1558 [N=30]
0,1521 [N=90]
0,0131
0,0198
0,257 
[0,351] 
0,656
Early stage 
Non-early stage 
0,1536 [N=71]
0,1522 [N=49]
0,0212
0,0134
0,661 
[0,685] 
0,316
High-tech 
Non-high-tech 
0,1531 [N=113]
0,1522 [N=7]
0,0189
0,000
0,624 
[0,903] 
0,435
 
Notes: The mean of the hurdle rate is compared for funds with different characteristics. The dataset includes 120 European VC-funds, 
for which complete data about the management fees were available. For more details see notes of table 3. 
Table 6: Univariate Comparisons ‘Carry Option Value’   22
Similar to the level of the carried interest, there is no large variation around the carry 
option values’ mean. Therefore, univariate comparisons presented in table 6 with the options’ 
value of performance related compensation as dependent variable do not show significant 
differences.  
Table 7 summarizes the univariate comparisons of the capital contributions done by the 
venture capitalists. Despite the varying amount of capital contributions made by the managers 
of the different funds, we found no significant differences in the mean of the amount of 
capital contribution, if the dataset is divided by the known measures. 
 
Capital contribution 
  Mean Std. Deviation p-value 
-equal variances not 
assumed- 
[Equal variances] 
Test for 
Equality of 
variances:
p-value
Debut fund 
Non-debut fund 
0,0148 [N=22]
0,0158 [N=24]
0,0366
0,0402
0,932 
[0,933] 
0,922
Time in business 
> median (2,5 years) 
<= median 
0,0169 [N=23]
0,0137 [N=23]
0,0416
0,0315
 
0,782 
[0,782] 
0,678
Size of VC-Fund 
> median (€ 73,32 Mio) 
<= median 
0,0145 [N=23]
0,0161 [N=23]
0,0408
0,0360
 
0,888 
[0,888] 
0,775
Growth of vc-pool in year of 
first closing 
> median (61,46%) 
<= median 
0,0078 [N=21]
0,0216 [N=25]
0,00941
0,05060
 
 
0,193 
[0,225] 
0,019**
Year of closing 
2000-2001 
1996-1999 
0,0149 [N=27]
0,0159 [N=19]
0,0381
0,0391
 
0,932 
[0,931] 
0,728
Anglo-Saxon legal origin 
Continental-European origin 
0,0110 [N=10]
0,0165 [N=36]
0,0145
0,0425
0,515 
[0,689] 
0,278
Early stage 
Non-early stage 
0,0246 [N=23]
0,0061 [N=23]
0,0525
0,0060
0,106 
[0,10*] 
0,004
High-tech 
Non-high-tech 
0,0155 [N=45]
0,0100 [N=1]
0,0385
 
[0,889] 
 
Notes: The mean of the level of capital contributions is compared for funds with different characteristics. The dataset includes 46 
European VC-funds, for which complete data about the management fees were available. For more details see notes of table 3. 
Table 7: Univariate Comparisons ‘Capital Contribution’ 
The univariate comparisons of the number of restrictions and regulations are summarized 
in table 8. The results show some significant differences in the mean number of covenants, if 
the dataset is divided by two measures suggested by the reputation hypothesis. “Non-debut 
funds” have a significantly higher restrictiveness. These differences are significant at the 1% 
level. Large funds also include more covenants. This is significant on a 5% level. These 
results reject the assumptions made by the reputation hypothesis. Furthermore, we can find 
dependencies from the date of contracting and according to the funds’ legal origin. 
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Number of Covenants 
  Mean Std. Deviation p-value 
-equal variances not 
assumed- 
[Equal variances] 
Test for 
Equality of 
variances:
p-value
Debut fund 
Non-debut fund 
3,1 [N=22]
5,7 [N=24]
3,16
2,54
0,005*** 
[0,004***] 
0,115
Time in business 
> median (2,5 years) 
<= median 
5,1 [N=23]
3,8 [N=23]
2,96
3,17
 
0,171 
[0,171] 
0,243
Size of VC-Fund 
> median (€ 73,32 Mio) 
<= median 
5,6 [N=23]
3,4 [N=23]
2,79
3,08
 
0,018** 
[0,018**] 
0,381
Growth of vc-pool in year of 
first closing 
> median (61,46%) 
<= median 
4,8 [N=28]
3,9 [N=18]
3,00
3,25
 
 
0,335 
[0,325] 
0,990
Year of closing 
2000-2001 
1996-1999 
5,3 [N=27]
3,3 [N=19]
2,75
3,28
 
0,042** 
0,035** 
0,257
Anglo-Saxon legal origin 
Continental-European origin 
6,7 [N=10]
3,8 [N=36]
3,53
2,70
0,035** 
[0,008***] 
0,438
Early stage 
Non-early stage 
4,3 [N=23]
4,7 [N=23]
2,71
3,49
0,674 
[0,674] 
0,166
High-tech 
Non-high-tech 
4,5 [N=45]
2,0 [N=1]
3,11
 
[0,43] 
 
Notes: The mean of the number of included covenants is compared for funds with different characteristics. The dataset includes 46 
European VC-funds, for which complete data about the management fees were available. For more details see notes of table 3. 
Table 8: Univariate Comparisons ‘Number of Covenants’ 
c.  Multivariate analyses 
We examined the determinants of the NPV of the management fee, the performance 
sensitivity, and the number of covenants (out of a total of 14) by applying a regression 
analysis with the econometric specification of ordinary least square. We analysed, however, 
the determinants of the hurdle rates by employing both the econometric specification of 
ordinary least square and the LOGIT-Model. For the OLS regression analysis we used the 
level of the received hurdle rate (preferred return on committed capital p.a.) as the dependent 
variable. Furthermore, we examined the determinants of a managing directors’ obligation for 
a capital contribution by applying the Logit Model. The Logit-Models are employed 
determining the probability of the existence of any hurdle rate or any obligated capital 
contribution. Since the variation of the level of capital contribution is not normally distributed 
the econometric specification of OLS regression cannot be used. To avoid disturbing effects 
of multicollinearity we did the regression analyses more than once dropping some explanatory 
variables with linear relationship. Since in any case the results do not change significantly we 
can not observe strong effects of multicollinearity. Results are presented in table 9, 10 and 11, 
page 36.   24
Table 9 presents the OLS regressions with the number of included covenants as the 
dependent variables. We have done the analysis of covenants twice with two alternative 
dependent variables. First, we examined the influence of the determinants on the number of 
included covenants. Next, we tested the robustness of the results by replacing the dependent 
variable by a weighted number of covenants. Even if, in general, the meanings of the same 
covenants correspond to each other, the particular covenants can have different 
characteristics. The covenants are not standardized and differ with regard to the degree of 
restrictiveness. Whereas for example one partnership restricts leverage completely another 
partnership allows a leverage of 30%. Both partnership agreements include this covenant, but 
the level of restrictiveness is completely different. The analysis can be distorted if an all-or-
nothing covenant inclusion is assumed. To address this concern we weight the covenants: the 
restriction on the size of investment in one firm is weighted with ω =1, if the allowed 
maximum investment size is not exceeding 25% of the committed capital (otherwise ω =0). 
We weighted all other covenants, which prescribe a certain level of restrictiveness like the 
restriction on the use of debt with ω = [100% - percentage of committed capital that can be 
used for the particular action]. Except these covenants that give subjectively limited 
restriction (ω =0,5), all other covenants are weighted with ω =1, if they are included. The 
results of both regression analyses mainly correspond to each other.  
Table 10 presents the results of the regression analyses with the NPV of management fee 
and the performance sensitivity of the compensation as the dependent variables. Finally, table 
11 presents the results of the Logit Models and OLS regression with the venture capitalists’ 
obligation for a capital contribution and the hurdle rate as dependent variables. 
i.  Effects of reputation on contractual design 
We test whether the independent variable, non-debut manager that proxy for high 
reputation of the funds’ manager differs from zero. Table 9 presents the effect of reputation 
on the use of covenants. The coefficient of the dummy variable characterizing non-debut fund 
managers is significantly positive. There are no significant influences by the other control 
variables which are used as inferior proxies of reputation. The reputation hypothesis is 
rejected on a 1% level of significance (on a 5% level of significance if the weighted number 
of covenants is used as dependent variable). Empirical results show that European fund 
managers who managed at least one fund before are more restricted than debut fund 
managers. This contradicts the assumption of the reputation hypothesis. The usual theoretical   25
assumptions are not met. Reputation seems not to be seen as an additional security for the 
investor that allows the venture capitalists to reduce his own restrictiveness.   
Why do empirical results in the VC-market not show the usual effects of reputation on 
contracting? Why is higher reputation a driver of an increased restrictiveness? Aghion and 
Bolton (1992) analysed contractual incompleteness under consideration of different wealth 
constraints of the entrepreneur (as the agent: in our case the venture capitalist) and outside 
investors (as the principal). They suggest that “both have potentially conflicting objectives 
since the entrepreneur cares about both pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns from the project 
while the investor is only concerned about monetary returns.”
42 The theoretical framework of 
the reputation hypothesis assumed the following: not all potential conflicts have to be 
resolved by ex ante contracting if a potential loss of reputation gives incentives to work 
according to the investors’ interests. The maintenance of a good reputation is considered as a 
non-pecuniary return. This, however, seems only to be true if there involved parties have an 
infinite time horizon and the importance of that non-pecuniary return does not decrease over 
time.  
In the VC-business, there are different governance structures which implicate different 
motivation pattern and may allow another interpretation. Usually, the business of a VC-
company is done by just a certain number of general partners with restricted active time in 
business. Their wealth and financial situations change over the years. While managing their 
first fund they have to gain reputation which is an important factor for follow on fund raising 
with larger sizes. Initially, they have to work hard to gain that reputation. Later, if they had 
raised lots of funds their incentives to hold reputation may decrease, because their time in 
business is going to end. Their wealth situation changed and they do not have to rely on 
reputation as the key for building up their business. An ending time in business reduces the 
value of reputation as an additional security for the investor.
43 In the VC-market, this 
changing incentive situation has effects on contractual restrictiveness. Our argumentation is 
similar to that given by the learning model of Gompers and Lerner. As a result however, they 
assume changing incentive compensation. In Europe, we give empirical evidence that 
different inherent incentive situations do not affect compensation schemes, but the contractual 
restrictiveness. 
                                                 
42 See Aghion/Bolton (1992), pp. 473. 
43 This interpretation concerns to the learning model of Gompers and Lerner. Furthermore, example calculations 
of the revenues per general partners are given by Sahlmann (1990), pp 494 ff. It is shown in how far the GPs 
wealth situation changes if they were able to manage at least one fund successfully.       26
For European partnership agreements the empirical results show only little evidence that 
reputation affects compensation terms. There is no significant effect on the fixed fees over 
funds’ life, on the performance sensitivity of the compensation, and the hurdle rate (table 10 
and 11). We conclude that reputation does not seem to affect compensation. The results in the 
first panel of table 11, however, show that the proxy for reputation is important in determining 
the existence of a contractual obligation for the general managers to make capital 
contributions. Empirical results show that non-debut fund manager with higher reputation are 
more often obligated to make a capital contribution than first time fund managers (5% level of 
significance). This is consistent with the assumptions of the learning model. This model 
assumed that there should be a higher need for monetary incentives for fund managers with 
good reputation. Furthermore, this result confirms the interpretation made above. When 
established funds care less about their reputation, stronger performance related incentives may 
be used side by side with more restrictive covenants in order to prevent opportunistic 
behaviour. Of course, there is another possible interpretation: managers of established funds 
are often wealthier than managers of debut funds and may find it easier to make capital 
contributions.   
ii.  Effects of bargaining power on contractual design 
As tables 9 and 10 show, the variable that measures the growth rate of the venture pool 
has a significant effects on compensation, but not on the number of restrictive covenants. In 
years with a strongly growing VC-pool the demanded fixed fees decline. The bargaining 
power hypothesis is rejected on a 1% significance level.
44 According to highly standardized 
carried interest payments, the performance sensitivity is likely to increase in times the 
managers have high bargaining power. The results that are presented in panel 2 of table 10 are 
not consistent with the theoretical assumptions, either. Concerning the performance sensitivity 
the bargaining power hypothesis is rejected on a 10% and 5% significance level. Table 11 
shows the effects of high bargaining power on the contracted hurdle rates and the capital 
contribution obligations. The bargaining power proxy significantly lowers the hurdle rate. 
This is confirmed by the OLS regression on a 10% level of significance and by the Logit 
                                                 
44 The results of the regression analysis are even confirmed, if the NPV of the management fee is calculated in 
the following way: The annually management fee payments (as the percentage on committed capital) are 
discounted only over this period of time, which is fixed in the partnership agreement (or in the PPM, if the PA is 
not available). If a life time extension is allowed, the management fees of the corresponding years are discounted 
with the increased rate of 20%. The OLS regression leads to the same signs of the coefficients and the null 
hypotheses of no difference are rejected for the same variables.    27
Model on a 5% significance level. The obligation to make a capital contribution is not 
affected by the supply/demand situation.  
Most of these results, except those concerning the hurdle rate, reject the bargaining 
power hypothesis. However, the effects of increasing bargaining power on compensation 
terms are jointly consistent and can be interpreted: As a result of lower fixed charges, the 
importance of performance related earnings as a part of the overall management 
compensation is rising. This is indicated by an increasing sensitivity of compensation to the 
performance. Our empirical results show that in times with a large VC-pool growth 
decreasing hurdle rates increase the value of the venture capitalists’ carry option and intensify 
the importance of variable compensation. To test robustness of these results, we exchange the 
level of carried interest by the carried interest options’ value measuring the individual 
sensitivity of compensation. Table 10 panel 3 presents the results that confirm our former 
findings: in times with a growing VC-pool, sensitivity of compensation to performance is 
increasing (10% or 5% level of significance). We recognize that venture capitalists with high 
bargaining power do not try to fix a higher amount of compensation for future times, but trust 
in performance related earnings. They believe in their future performance. This effect can be 
interpreted as a kind of overconfidence in times of growing markets.
45 Hvide (2000) 
summarizes several studies from psychology and experimental economics indicating that 
agents are overconfident about their own abilities. This can hardly be explained by any 
rational formation.
46  The findings of Camerer and Lovallo (1999) determine that 
overconfidence leads to excessive business entry. While analysing the impact of CEOs’ 
overconfidence on mergers and acquisitions, Malmendier and Tate (2002) suggested that 
overconfident CEOs over-estimate their ability to generate returns. They found that 
overconfidence has the largest effect in firms with most cash.
47 Kyle and Wang (1997) predict 
that an overconfident trader trades more aggressively than his rational opponent.
48 This even 
                                                 
45 We see overconfidence also in the variation of the total compensation (NPV of management fee + option value 
carry). In times with a growing vc-pool it is also significantly decreasing. Only higher capital gains could 
compensate this decrease.  See Table 10 Panel 4  
46 See Hvide (2000), pp. 1 and 17, also Weinstein (1980), Taylor/Brown (1988). 
47 See Malmendier, / Tate (2002), pp. 1. 
48 See Kyle and Wang (1997), pp. 2074; as a result, they assume that the overconfident trader makes a higher 
expected profit and utility as his rational opponent. Referring to the changing venture capitalists attitude 
towards the way of fund managing and the changing preferred form of compensation, Sahlmann (1990), pp 
496 ff. suggests the inherent agency problem of higher valued carry options: „if one party has a contingent 
claim on value, there is an implicit incentive to increase risk“. Analysing 2600 investments done between the 
years 1972 and 2002 of 60 funds of 32 venture capital companies [CEPRES Center of Private Equity 
Research] we found empirical evidence. If we assume identically independently distributed investments, the 
results of univariate comparisons indicate a significantly higher mean return but also higher volatility of 
investments that were done in times with high capital commitments. The mean IRR of investments that were   28
seems to affect the compensation schemes. Literature about the effects of overconfidence 
predicts that overconfident managers will prefer performance based incentive schemes more 
often than standard theory predicts.
49 Allen and Lueck (1995) found some evidence that this 
effect of overconfidence on the incentive design of contracts may be right.
50 All these general 
findings correspond to the results of our study. In times with a growing VC-pool, this means 
increasing cash inflows but a relatively constant number of fund managers, we can see 
indications of the discussed management-overconfidence. The fund managers lower the 
investment hurdles by lowering fixed charges and, therefore, ease business entry. Driven by 
the actually good market situation they are confident to compensate the lower fixed charges 
by performance related earnings. They expect higher future performance for themselves. As a 
result, they prefer to be paid by more sensitive compensation. We recognize a change to the 
riskier variable form of management compensation. This suits the generally more aggressive 
trading attitude of overconfident fund managers.   
iii.  Other factors  
The results of tables 9, 10, and 11 indicate no significant time trend. The time trend 
variable adds little explanatory power to other variables. Testing for robustness we 
investigated the influences of the markets’ downturn in 2001 on contractual design. We 
determine exactly the same significances of all variables while changing the factor “date of 
contracting” by a dummy variable indicating the year 2001 with an economical downturn.  
The legal origin of the VC-company, however, has a strong impact on contract design. 
Anglo-Saxon fund managers are confronted with a stronger restrictiveness. This corresponds 
to the literature and our assumptions made above. The legal environment of common law in 
Anglo-Saxon countries directly influences the property rights protection done by the 
implementation of more covenants.  
Overall, we find a more sophisticated use of covenants by non-debut funds and in mature 
Anglo-Saxon markets. Next to our former interpretation based on different incentive aspects 
between debut and non-debut fund manager and based on the effects of different legal origins, 
Kaplan / Martel / Strömberg (2002) considered another explanation of those empirical 
                                                                                                                                                         
done in times with capital commitments above the median is 66.61%, in times with capital inflows below the 
median 4.1%. St Deviation in times with high capital commitments is 819%, in times with low commitments 
69%. The null hypothesis of equal mean IRRs is rejected on a 1% level of significance. This results are robust 
to any variation of the dataset, e.g. if only realized investments without a valuation are basis of calculations. 
49 See Camerer / Lueck (1999), pp. 306 and 315. 
50 See Allen / Lueck (1995).   29
findings: the experience of the venture capitalists and the maturity of the markets may 
influence the contractual design. Especially first time VC-managers or those acting in a new 
market with legal and institutional impediments to contracting may need time in order to learn 
to structure contracts in that environment. It may take some time before the market 
participants converge to an optimal contractual design.
51 Initially, the transaction costs of 
writing sophisticated contracts including sufficient covenants are higher. This leads to a larger 
incompleteness of contracts with a lower number of included covenants. In Europe, we found 
empirical evidence.        
Finally, as we assumed before early stage and high tech focused funds charge higher 
fixed fees to compensate higher administrative costs (table 10, panel 1). The coefficients of 
the corresponding control variables are significantly different from zero (at least 5% level of 
significance). However, there is no definite significant proof whether those funds have lower 
incentive compensation. Though highly standardized carried interest payments and higher 
fixed management fees, high tech funds do not have significantly lower performance 
sensitivity in compensation (table 10, panel 2 and 3). Furthermore, we found no effects on 
other compensation terms and on contractual restrictiveness (table 9 and 11).  
7.  Comparison of US and European empirical findings 
Our results indicate strong differences in the way how reputation and bargaining power 
determine the design of US and European partnership agreements.   
We find empirical evidence that there are different determinants of contractual 
restrictiveness in the US and in Europe.  In the US, the number of included covenants is 
significantly influenced by the supply/demand situation for VC-services. Fund manager use 
their bargaining power in growth years to reduce contractual restrictiveness. In Europe, we 
found no evidence that growing bargaining power affects the completeness of contracts. We 
showed that reputation is the determinant which affects the use of covenants. The existence of 
different inherent incentives that are given to managers with or without reputation is adjusted 
by different contractual regulations.  
                                                 
51 See Kaplan / Martel / Strömberg (2002), pp. 4 ff.; in addition, table 3, 4, and 6 show higher variations of the 
management fee and the NPV of management fee between the samples’ funds in Continental-Europe than in 
Anglo-Saxon countries and if it is charged by debut funds. This is a sign of a lower level of professionalization 
and optimal contract design. These findings confirm the assumption made by Kaplan et al. For further analyses 
see Feinendegen/ Schmidt/ Wahrenburg (2003), pp.21.   30
Compensation terms are also influenced by different determinants. In the US, the fund 
managers’ reputation affects both the NPV of management fees and the performance 
sensitivity of compensation. Young debut funds receive a larger fixed compensation and less 
performance related compensated. This may be explained by the fact that unknown young 
fund managers’ work harder anyway in order to gain reputation. Highly incentive orientated 
compensation is not necessary. In Europe, we find less evidence that higher incentive 
compensation corrects inherent incentive gaps of fund managers with high reputation. 
Management fee or carried interest are not related to the reputation of the venture capitalist.  
For the recent years of European VC-market development and for the US VC-market 
between 1972 and 1992, empirical results indicate different market mechanisms. Since the 
supply/demand situation for VC-services in the US affects the contractual restrictiveness and 
in Europe it influences the monetary price which has to be paid for these services, the price 
system seems better to work in Europe. Varying inherent working incentives for fund 
managers with or without reputation are adjusted in the US by changing monetary incentives 
and in Europe by changing contractual restrictiveness. Through effects on different 
contractual elements, in Europe and in the US the general assumptions of the learning model 
are confirmed.   
8. Summary and outlook 
The similar development of the US-American and the European VC markets of the early 
80ties and the mid 90ties, respectively, provides an attractive basis for analysing European 
market standards and comparing them to preceding US trends. In this paper, we empirically 
analyse the contractual relations between European venture capital funds and investors. We 
explore those contractual arrangements that are used to regulate the principal agent 
relationship between investors and fund-management. Contractual key elements are certain 
covenants, which restrict the venture capitalists from opportunistic behaviour, and 
compensation terms. In respect to compensation, our analysis refers to the management fee, 
the carried interest and its call option value, the hurdle rate, and the fund managers’ obligation 
to make their own capital contribution.     
To expose market reactions in the VC-market, we examine the economical effect of two 
determinants on contractual design: the agents’ reputation and bargaining power. We develop 
empirical evidence that the effect of these determinants on the design of contracts does not   31
completely correspond to general theoretical approaches. In the VC-business, markets seem to 
work different.  
Regarding the question how VC-markets are working, we found empirical evidence. Our 
findings indicate a substantial impact of the managers’ reputation and bargaining power on 
contractual design. Contrary to theoretical reasoning, reputation seems to aggravate the 
incentive conflict between investors and managers instead of aligning their interests. This 
increases the need for higher contractual restrictiveness. Furthermore, we found signs of 
overconfidence. Managers in times with a growing VC-pool seem to prefer higher 
performance-related compensation and lower fixed payments. They renounce from using their 
negotiation power to increase guaranteed payments over the whole funds’ life. They rely more 
on own future performance. This does not correspond to the price adjustments we expect from 
rational players.  
We also unveil remarkable differences between the European and the US venture capital 
market to those of earlier US studies conducted by Gompers and Lerner (1996) and (1999). 
They analysed US VC partnership agreements between 1979 and 1992. In comparison to the 
US, the European market seems to be different. Changing inherent incentives for fund 
managers with or without reputation are adjusted in the US by changing monetary incentives 
and in Europe by changing contractual restrictiveness. In Europe, the supply/demand situation 
for VC-services influences the management compensation but not the number of covenants. 
In the US, the contractual restrictiveness is weaker when supply of venture capital increases. 
When interpreting these different findings, we have to take under consideration that the 
European sample refers to partnership agreements which are drafted between 1996 and the 
end of 2001. We have no indication for the last years whether market forces on contractual 
arrangements also changed in the US. On the other hand, while approaching a global market 
standard we will maybe observe a changing European situation if we imply a mature and 
more professionalized US market. In the next years we can give empirical evidence.   
Directions for future research are given by the analysis of dependencies between the 
contractual arrangements and the real net monetary performance of the VC investment and its 
volatility. In Fn.48 we made an initial investigation based on empirical data. However, to 
refer such an analysis to the results of this study it requires a corresponding dataset, which 
delivers performance information about the same 122 partnerships. These data are only 
observable over the complete period of the individual funds’ life. Taking into account that the   32
sample funds are not yet in a mature stage, appropriate data will not be available before a 
couple of years.    33
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Tables 
 
  # Covenants 
 
# Covenants
(test for multicollinearity)
# Covenants 
(weighted) 
Constant  -1097,666 
0,168 
1,259
0,593
-968,51 
0,224 
Non-Debut-
Fund 
2,444*** 
0,01 
2,658*** 
0,001
2,265** 
0,013 
Time in 
business 
-0,1 
0,330 
-0,100 
0,303 
Fund size  0,00137 
0,390 
0,0014 
0,366 
Growth of VC-
Pool 
3,08 
0,425 
2,217
0,564
2,064 
0,413 
Date of 
contracting 
0,549 
0,168 
0,485 
0,223 
Anglo-Saxon 
origin of funds’ 
management 
3,382*** 
0,001 
3,533***
0,000
3,075*** 
0,002 
Early stage 
focus 
-0,139 
0,860 
-0,461
0,547
-0,344 
0,647 
Non-Hightech 
focus 
-2,642 
0,359 
-4,156
0,132
-2,524 
0,362 
    
R
2  0,459 0,408 0,438 
Adj. R
2  0,342 0,334 0,317 
p-value (F-
statistic) 
0,002 0,000 0,003 
  
Notes: The table presents the results of the OLS regression; the dataset includes 46 European VC-funds. The first row 
presents the dependent variables: The number of included covenants (out of 14) as a measure of contractual 
restrictiveness.  The first column presents the independent variables. “Early stage”, “Non-high-tech”, “Non-debut fund” 
and “Anglo-Saxon origin of funds’ management” are dummy variables with the base variables “Late/Balanced stage”, 
“High-tech”, “Debut fund”, “Non-Anglo-Saxon origin”, respectively. In the second to the eight’ columns the coefficients 
of the OLS regression analyses are presented. In italics below the β  estimates the p-value of the absolute 
heteroscedastic-consistent t-statistics is presented. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. The last three rows present the r-square, the adjusted r-square, and the p-value of the F-test, that 
the set of coefficients is equal to zero. 
 
Testing the robustness of results we included also dummy variables for all other European countries. We find no 
significant coefficient for other country dummies. The coefficients of the other factors do not change.  
Moreover, we test for influences of the markets’ downturn in 2001 on contractual design. We determine exactly the same 
significances of all variables if changing the factor “date of contracting” by a dummy variable indicating the year 2001 
with an economical downturn.  
 
All OLS regressions satisfy the assumptions of the classical linear regression model. The chi-square goodness of fit test 
confirms the normality of the disturbance terms. The null hypotheses that the disturbances came from the normality 
probability distribution can not be rejected (chi-square=0; p-value=1). 
 
It is conceivable that some econometric variables affect the contractual design and are, in turn, affected by it. It is likely 
that investors’ decision concerning their investment amount is influenced by the quality of contractual design. We tested 
for simultaneity between compensations and fund sizes by applying the Hausman Specification Test. The hypothesis of 
simultaneity between # of covenants and fund size is rejected (t-value of  i ε ˆ =0,492). [Gujarati, 1995, pp.670 ff.] 
Table 9: Regression Analyses Covenants    38
 
  Panel 1  Panel 2  Panel 3  Panel 4 
  NPV 
Management 
Fee (lifetime10 
years 
standardized) 
NPV 
Manageme
nt Fee 
(lifetime10 
years 
standardized) 
(test for 
multicollineari
ty) 
NPV 
Management 
Fee (lifetime10 
years 
standardized) 
(test for 
multicollinearity)
NPV 
Management 
Fee (lifetime10 
years 
standardized) 
(test for 
multicollinearity)
Sensitivity
(carry/
NPV Mgt 
Fee)
Sensitivity 
(test for 
multicol-
linearity)
Sensitivity 
II (value of 
carry 
option/ 
NPV Mgt 
Fee) 
Sensitivity 
II (value of 
carry 
option/
NPV Mgt 
Fee) 
(t. for 
mult.coll.)
Total 
Compen-
sation
(NPV 
Manage-
ment 
Fee+Op-
tion Value 
Carry)
Constant  -2,9 
0,565 
0,185*** 
0,00 
0,182***
0,00
-6,727
0,155
42,50
0,693
1,03
0,000
32,35 
0,694 
0,784
0,000
-2,295 
0,719 
Non-Debut-
Fund 
-0,0043 
0,498 
-0,005 
0,382 
-0,00334
0,536
0,0332
0,809
-0,001
0,992
0,0252 
0,809 
-0,0008 
0,992
-0,0003
0,974
Time in 
business 
0,0002 
0,747 
 0,00018
0,725
-0,0089
0,518
 -0,00681 
0,518 
 -0,0001
0,900
Fund size  -0,000012 
0,321 
 0,0001
0,693
0,000079 
0,694 
-0,000012
0,480
Growth of 
VC-Pool 
-0,0598*** 
0,008 
-0,0635*** 
0,002 
-0,068***
0,003
0,819*
0,086
0,85**
0,049
0,624* 
0,086 
0,647** 
0,049
-0,0502*
0,076
Date of 
contracting 
0,0015 
0,540 
 0,00344
0,146
-0,0202
0,7
-0,0158 
0,701 
0,0013
0,681
Anglo-
Saxon 
origin of 
funds’ 
manage-
ment 
-0,0092 
0,137 
-0,009 
0,142 
-0,0085
0,156
-0,0098
0,108
0,0538
0,684
0,044
0,721
0,040 
0,685 
0,034 
0,722
-0,004
0,575
Early stage 
focus 
0,0137** 
0,014 
0,0136*** 
0,010 
0,0134**
0,0137
0,0126**
0,022
-0,24*
0,044
-0,230**
0,041
-0,183** 
0,044 
-0,176** 
0,042
0,0138**
0,05
Non-
Hightech 
focus 
-0,0294** 
0,014 
-0,0297*** 
0,008 
-0,0281**
0,0135
-0,0227**
0,05
0,371
0,140
0,36
0,137
0,283 
0,141 
0,274 
0,133
-0,0263*
0,079
      
R
2  0,183 0,182  0,173 0,127 0,086 0,086 0,087 0,086 0,103
Adj. R
2  0,122 0,146  0,135 0,088 0,02 0,045 0,018 0,046 0,035
p-value (F-
statistic) 
0,004 0,000  0,000 0,008 0,27 0,06 0,27 0,067 0,160
 
Notes: The table presents the results of the OLS regression. The number of included observation varies and is shown in table 4, 5, and 6. The first 
row presents the dependent variables: NPV of Management Fee (panel 1), the performance sensitivity of compensation (as the ratio of carried 
interest to NPV of management fee/panel 2), the revised measure of compensation sensitivity (the ratio of the carries’ option value to the NPV of 
Mgt Fee/ panel 3) and the total compensation (NPV of Management Fee + option value carry/panel 4).  
 
Testing the robustness of results we included also dummy variables for all other European countries. Results do not change. We find no significant 
coefficient for other country dummies.  
The hypothesis of simultaneity between NPV of Mgt Fee and fund size is rejected (t-value of  i ε ˆ =-0,873), of simultaneity between sensitivity and 
fund size is rejected (t-value of  i ε ˆ =0,727), and of simultaneity between the revised sensitivity and fund size is rejected (t-value of  i ε ˆ =0,725).  
For more details see notes of table 9. 
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  Panel 1  Panel  2 
  Capital Contribution (Logit)
Reference Group
Contribution=1
Hurdle Rate
(OLS)
Hurdle Rate  
(Logit) 
Reference group: Hurdle 
Rate = 1 
Hurdle Rate 
(Logit)
Reference group: Hurdle 
Rate = 1
Constant  137,33
0,84
-3,62
0,59
-285,2 
0,301 
1,485**
0,023
Non-Debut-Fund  1,95**(7,05)
0,039
-0,0003
0,972
-0,154 (0,859) 
0,750 
-0,476 (0,621)
0,215
Time in business  -0,073(0,996)
0,444
0,00157*
0,073
-0,078 (0,924) 
0,119 
Fund size  0,00307(0,997)
0,448
0,0000076
0,645
0,0002 (1,0) 
0,834 
Growth of VC-Pool  -2,58(0,075)
0,463
-0,052*
0,082
-2,639* (0,07) 
0,1 
-2,9**(0,054)
0,05
Date of contracting  -0,06(0,93)
0,84
0,0018
0,584
0,193(1,21) 
0,29 
Anglo-Saxon origin of funds’ 
management 
0,823(2,27)
0,373
0,0012
0,878
-0,175 (0,839) 
0,69 
-0,0637 (0,938)
0,882
Early stage focus  -0,028(0,975)
0,96
-0,009
0,18
-0,352(0,70) 
0,383 
-0,332 (0,725)
0,402
Non-Hightech focus  19,58(321657276)
0
-0,0116
0,454
0,881 (2,41) 
0,346 
0,545 (1,725)
0,541
   
R
2  0,097  
Adj. R
2  0,031
 
p-value (F-statistic)  0,18
 
2 χ -statistics 
(p-value) 
8,03
(0,429)
11,88 
(0,158) 
7,1
(0,213)
   
Notes: The table presents the results of the OLS regression and Logit analyses. The number of included observation varies and is shown in 
table 5 and 7. The first row presents the dependent variables: obligated capital contribution by the venture capitalist and hurdle rate. The first, 
the third, and the fourth column present the results of the Logit-Analyses with funds obligating a capital contribution or conceding a hurdle 
rate coded as 1 (reference group) and those not obligating a contribution or not conceding a hurdle rate coded as 0. In the brackets next to the 
β  estimates the odd-ratios are presented. In Italics the level of significances according to the Wald-test-statistics is given. The last four 
rows present the r-square, the adjusted r-square, the p-value of the F-test, that the set of coefficients is equal to zero, and the chi-square 
statistic (model fitting). For more details see notes of table 3. 
 
Testing the robustness of results we included also dummy variables for all other European countries. Results do not change. We find no 
significant coefficient for other country dummies.  
 
The hypothesis of simultaneity between Hurdle rate and fund size is rejected (t-value of  i ε ˆ =0,651). 
Table11: Regression Analysis: compensation terms II   40
       
Appendix – Description of the analysed covenants 
 
In this section we give a quality description of the analysed covenants of the three subclasses. 
The following four covenants correspond to class one: 
The first covenant restricts the size of investment in one firm. Due to the carried interest, 
which is paid after the investors have received at least 100 per cent of their invested capital, 
the VC contract can be seen as a call option. This fact suggests an inherent agency problem. 
According to the Black-Scholes model the value of a call option increases with higher risk. 
Value maximation of the call option owned by the venture capitalists implies therefore an 
attitude to increase risk. The venture capitalist does not participate in the monetary loss in the 
case of a negative return. To invest a higher amount in one portfolio company increases risk at 
the expense of diversification. Therefore, this covenant restricts the received risk. Moreover 
this covenant ensures the attempt of the venture capitalist to salvage an investment in a poorly 
performing company by doing several follow-on investments.
52  
 
The second covenant restricts the use of debt. As mentioned above the venture capitalist is an 
option holder and has incentives to increase the variance of their portfolios´ returns. 
Leveraging the fund will increase the received risk. This increases the value of the venture 
capitalists’ call option at the investors’ expense. The existence of a covenant that restricts the 
venture capitalists’ ability to borrow capital or to guarantee the debt of their portfolio 
companies reduces the venture capitalists’ opportunities of increasing his private benefit .
53  
 
Restrictions on co-investment with the same venture organizations’ earlier or later funds are 
given by the third covenant. The limited partnership as the organisational form allows the 
investment managers to manage several funds, which are formed some years apart. In contrast 
to a single investor, who is only interested in the performance of the fund he has actually 
invested in, the managing partners have to care about all the managed funds. The utility 
function of the managing partners is dependent on the performance and the private benefit 
received by all funds. Opportunistic behaviour is likely to be the result. Co-investment with 
earlier funds may often be the solution to salvage bad performing portfolio companies from 
earlier limited partnerships. New capital infusions will be used to improve the status or 
                                                 
52 Sahlmann (1990), pp.496 und Gompers/Lerner (1996), pp. 480 und Harris, M./ Raviv, A. (1979), pp. 231 f. 
53 Gompers / Lerner (1996), pp. 480   41
performance of earlier funds. The capital, which originally concerns to a later fund is not 
invested optimally for the investor’s purpose, but helps to increase the venture capitalists’ 
private benefit. Covenants on co-investment with earlier funds exist on different extent. Some 
partnerships are completely restricted to co-invest, some others need the approval of the 
fund’s advisory board or the majority of the limited partners.
 54  
 
Restrictions on reinvestment of capital gains should reduce private benefit as well. This kind 
of covenant is needed, because tapered compensation terms give the managing partners 
incentives to maximize the assets under investment. After the commitment period, 
management fees are often paid on basis of assets under management. Furthermore, the 
likelihood of higher carried interest payments is maximized if an increasing amount of capital 
is at the venture capitalists disposal for investment. Moreover, reinvestment of capital gains at 
advanced funds’ life increases the probability of extending the funds life. Recent investments 
are not mature enough to liquidate. The managing partners would continue to generate fees. 
Distributing capital gains would lower the compensation, which is paid to the venture 
capitalist. Therefore, the incentives of managing partners to reinvest capital gains are high, 
but not always optimal for the investors’ purpose. The investor would have more chances to 
maximize his utility, if he could make the decision of reinvestment by himself. He would be 
even free to invest in a better performing fund.
55 
 
The following covenants correspond to covenant class two and restrict the activities of the 
managing directors:  
 
The fifth covenant settles the possibility of co-investing by managing partners in portfolio 
companies. Direct investment in a portfolio company is restricted or limited. Co-investment in 
certain portfolio companies would dilute the incentive that is given by the carried interest to 
optimise the entire portfolio. The carried interest can be seen as an indirect participation on 
the whole portfolio. Single selected investments in certain portfolio companies would 
intensify the managing partners’ effort to increase the return of these companies. A portfolio 
optimisation is not guaranteed.
56  
                                                 
54 Gompers / Lerner (1996), pp. 481 
55 Gompers, P. / Lerner, J. (1996), pp. 481 
56 Gompers/Lerner (1996), pp.481 f.    42
 
Covenant number six restricts or limits the managing partners’ ability of investing in non 
portfolio companies, which are acting in the same or similar business fields that correspond to 
the funds investment area. The managing partners are restricted to do own investments in high 
quality companies, instead investing funds’ capital. Their monetary return should exclusively 
be generated by participating the portfolio return. This increases the incentive to take all 
potentially highly rewarded emerging companies, the managing partners have the opportunity 
to invest in, into the portfolio.  
 
Capital contribution of the managing directors was one of the mentioned solutions of agency 
problems. Restrictions on selling the managing partners’ partnership shares or interests 
maintain the incentives that are given by a capital contribution for the funds’ whole life. 
Covenant number seven limits the sale of partnership shares. Contractual regulations differ. 
Sometimes, partnership agreements restrict the managing partners completely to participate 
the venture fund. Some other agreements prescribe a participating share of a determined 
amount, but do not restrict a later sale of those shares. Long lasting real incentives are given, 
if the participation is prescribed and the sale of partnership shares is restricted.
57  
 
Covenant number eight restricts new fund raising by the managing partners over the 
managing period. They should engage completely in managing one fund. A new fund raising 
would reduce the venture capitalists’ attention on managing the former fund. The overall 
management fees paid by the limited partners of both funds, however, would increase. 
Usually the managing partners are restricted to raise new funds until a certain amount, mostly 
75 per cent, of committed capital is invested.
58  
 
The next covenant restricts outside actions done by the managing partners. Other actions than 
managing the venture fund are likely to reduce the effort given to the portfolio-management. 
Especially within the commitment period, where the due diligence of potential portfolio 
companies takes much time, all attention should be spend for managing the fund. According 
to that need this kind of covenant refers often only to a period of time until a certain amount 
                                                 
57 Gompers/Lerner (1996), pp. 482 ; Section 6.3 analyses the sample partnerships about the interaction of 
covenant number seven and the capital contribution that has to be donated by the investment managers. 
58 Gompers / Lerner (1996), pp. 482   43
of committed capital is invested. The analysis of the partnership agreements shows, that in 
most cases only other investment activities or consulting activities are restricted. That is a 
weak form of this covenant, but, however, it restricts opportunistic behaviour of the managing 
partners. It prevents conflicts, which arise by investing capital from different sources and 
consulting different venture funds. 
 
Covenant number ten restricts the addition of new managing partners. An extremely 
important factor within the due diligence process is the assessment of managing partners’ 
former performance. The quality of the management is a soft factor, which cannot be 
measured on a quantitative basis.
59 The later addition of new managing partners would take 
the investors possibility of judging the involved managing partners in advance. Less talented 
and competent managing partners could join the limited partnership and would dilute the 
overall managing performance. The originally involved venture capitalists may reduce their 
efforts for the funds’ management and may increase private benefits by concentrating on other 
actions.
60  
 
The last four covenants correspond to the covenant class three and restrict the type of 
investment. 
 
As mentioned above, the assessment of the managing partners’ competence and their 
extensive reputation in that kind of business are often decisive to make an actual investment. 
The eleventh covenant restricts the managing partners’ ability to invest funds’ capital in other 
venture funds. By doing so they would give investment decisions out of their hands. The 
managing partners would earn the same high compensation and would have less expenditure. 
These kinds of restrictions are particularly important for fund of fund investment companies  
to carry out wise investment decisions. To achieve the aspired return-risk profile, they have to 
relay on the pronounced investment procedure of the funds. Therefore, covenants, which 
adjust this on a contractual basis, are important for their portfolio management.
61 
 
                                                 
59 Zemke (1995), pp. 136 f. 
60 Gompers / Lerner (1996), pp. 482 f. and Zemke (1995), pp. 137 f. 
61 Gompers/Lerner (1996), pp. 483 and Ruhnka/Young (1991), pp. 116 ff. and Weitnauer (2001), pp. 269.   44
Another covenant restricts investments in public traded securities. These kinds of investments 
do not meet the requirements which are made on a VC fund. Venture capital investment is a 
more complicated investment process. The compensation that is received by the VC 
investment manager is much higher. Expectations on return on capital are also higher. 
Investors expect the venture capitalist to concentrate on their core business. 
 
The  thirteen’s covenant restricts also the type of investment. This covenant restricts the 
investment in other asset classes like e.g., derivative instruments or real estate. The use of 
derivatives and similar products would increase the risk associated with the capital 
investment. As mentioned before, rising risk increases the value of the venture capitalists’ 
compensation. He would generate private benefit. Moreover, this kind of covenant often 
restricts investments in asset classes where the managing partners have little expertise. The 
managers’ purpose of investing in other kinds of assets is to gain experience and reputation. 
This non-monetary private benefit would help the venture capitalists to expand their 
investment skills and to attract potential future investors. Actual investors would not gain 
advantages from that kind of investment experiments.
62 
 
Finally, we analysed a covenant that restricts the investment in companies which are actually 
controlled by the managing partners. Moreover, it restricts investment, if the managing 
partners are already invested in that company for their own account. The venture capitalists 
could increase their private benefit by investing funds’ capital in companies where they hold a 
monetary participation. This could lead to opportunistic behaviour of the managing partners, 
because an investment in those companies will not always be the optimal choice. 
 
                                                 
62 Gompers/Lerner (1996), pp. 483 f. 